African Unification Front
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HISTORIC OVERVIEW
WAR IN AFRICA: A LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR
During the Cold War, the United States shipped $1.5 billion in armaments to African military forces, including $400 million in arms and training to the Mobutu regime in Zaire (now the DRC) and over $250 million to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces in Angola. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. arms transfers to Africa have continued, albeit at a slower pace. From 1989 to 1998, the United States provided over $227 million in weapons and training to African military forces, of which over $111 million went to governments that have been directly or indirectly involved in the war in the DRC: Angola, Burundi, Chad, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. These figures do not include the $75 million in emergency aid to Rwanda that was provided in 1994.
Despite their failure to withdraw their armies from the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia and Zimbabwe all continued to receive arms and/or military training from the U.S. as of 1999/2000, the most recent year for which full statistics are available. Of the $19.5 in U.S. arms and training that was delivered to African armed forces in FY 1999, $4.8 million went to nations directly or indirectly involved in the war in the DRC, with about one-third of that total, $1.6 million, going to Uganda.
The Africa Demilitarization project at the Center for International Policy estimates that during FY 2000, the following countries involved in the war in the DRC or other African conflicts received substantial U.S. training: Chad ($2.9 million), Zimbabwe ($1.4 million), Rwanda ($.13 million), Namibia (.5 million), Uganda (.1 million), and Ethiopia and Eritrea (roughly $100,000 each). Meanwhile, participation by African nations in the Pentagon's Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program dropped significantly in FY 1999, the most recent year for which full statistics are available.
JCET programs in Africa during 1999 were conducted in Chad (35 personnel trained), Namibia (39 students trained), Djibouti, Mali, and Malawi. And the African Center for Strategic Studies, a U.S.-initiated school that allegedly trains foreign military personnel in management issues, has hosted soldiers from Angola, Chad, the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe in recent years.
Although these figures on U.S. arms and training programs in Africa are fairly modest compared to the scale of U.S. arms sales worldwide, which exceeded $16 billion in 1999, they are symbolically and substantively important because they reflect a tacit endorsement by the United States of the activities of several of the key nations involved in the war in the DRC.
ECONOMIC INTERESTS: THE MISSING LINK
Economic interests are a significant factor in the fighting in the DRC. Much has been made of the economic exploitation of the DRC by direct parties to the conflict, including Zimbabwe, Namibia, UNITA, Angola, the CLF (Congolese Liberation Front, formerly Movement for the Liberation of Congo, MLC) and RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy) Goma and RCD Kisangani to help fuel their war effort. But little attention has been given to Western corporations that are continuing to exploit the DRC for its mineral wealth, even in the midst of a multi-sided civil war.
Africans need Western technology, investment and cooperation to transfer minerals. Africans do not process these minerals; they are processed in the West. Africans are not dependant upon minerals used in high-tech industry, sophisticated defense projects, or materials used in space exploration. The West, and particularly the United States, is dependent upon the availability of strategic minerals, many of which the U.S. does not produce. Africa does not have a vibrant market for diamonds, which are cut and distributed in the West. Although Uganda has been the target of criticism and suspicion for exporting diamonds although it is not a diamond-producing nation, even these exports could not occur without the assistance or acquiescence of Western corporations.
A recent report by Karl Vick of the Washington Post on the increasing exports of "Col-Tan" -- colombium-tantalum -- from Eastern Congo provides an excellent case study of the role of strategic minerals in sustaining the war in DRC. Tantalum is a scarce strategic mineral that is utilized in everything from aircraft engines to computer chips. Tantulum exports from Eastern Congo via Rwanda skyrocketed in late 2000. The potential profits to all parties to the dispute that can be had by exploiting the DRC's mineral wealth are an issue that will have to be dealt with in any viable peace accord.
Western corporations are aware that revenues from mineral exploitation received by African countries involved in war are used to purchase military equipment. During the latest war in the DRC, corporate collaboration with the rebels has been very quiet. But it has clearly had a significant influence, as evidenced by the severe fighting in mineral rich areas in Katanga province and the brutal fighting between RCD factions in Kisangani. Considering the history of a strong U.S. corporate presence in the DRC, it is quite likely that U.S. mining interests have benefitted from the war.
The potential economic windfall from controlling key mining areas makes the possibility of implementing a durable cease-fire much more difficult. The U.S. has encouraged mineral investment in the unstable, fractured, and undemocratic country. The State Department claims that "the DRC is also a potential partner for increasing U.S. investment in minerals," and suggests that these investments are in the U.S. national interest. The U.S. has done little to encourage human investment. During Kabila's march across Zaire there was a distinct correlation between mining interests and support for Kabila's military.
U.S. corporations were very active in vying for new mineral deals with Laurent Kabila, even while he was still a rebel leader. As U.S. corporations were lining up to cut deals with Kabila, The Wall Street Journal was able to gather information about the war from, "an American pilot flying for the rebels." Mawampanga Mwana, a U.S. trained rebel high commissioner of finance was a key liaison for negotiating deals with U.S. mining companies. Bechtel Corporation worked closely with Kabila to draw up "the most complete mineralogical and geographical data of the former Zaire ever assembled, information worth a fortune to any prospective mining or oil firm." The relationship between Bechtel and Kabila's rebels went beyond business. Robert Stewart, an executive from Bechtel became a close advisor to Kabila traveling the country at his side "to help him deal with ethnic uprisings." There were strong suspicions that Bechtel's information assisted Kabila in determining his war strategy.
In a classic case of cronyism, the first mining deal made with Laurent Kabila was made with American Mineral Fields. The head of AMF was at the time Mike McMurrough, a native of Bill Clinton's home town of Hope, Arkansas. AMF secured a $1 billion deal for the mining of cobalt and copper. It was reported that AMF had been in negotiations with Kabila well before many people throughout the DRC were aware of Kabila's visions or political philosophy.
The minerals in the DRC are considered to be among the purest in the world. They are also considered to be "under-explored" in the eyes of many experts. Both conditions add to the attractiveness of the Congo to mining interests. Because of the quality and quantity of the DRC's mineral resources, many corporations are willing to endure the instability of the country in the hopes of reaping a massive profits in the future. Unlike many other African countries where large, established firms control natural resource extraction, the DRC is somewhat of a frontier that is "wide open for business*as vast mineral resources are beckoning foreign companies, prompting a scramble that recalls the grab for wealth 120 years ago."
In January 2001 the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy issued a statement that said it was selling mining 'monopolies' in areas it controls. It has also been reported that the area controlled by Jean Pierre Bemba "has become a separate economy" in which "Foreign entrepreneurs are involved in developing businesses for a market of some seven million people."
BUSH POLICY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE DRC
In several essays published during the 1990s, Kansteiner expressed his opinion regarding Clinton Administration policy in the Great Lakes region. Kansteiner agreed with what he perceived as Clinton's neglect of the unfolding disaster. "Any U.S. attempt to become militarily involved would have been a very unfortunate mistake." But the U.S. already had quite an extensive legacy of military involvement in the region. Although he freely admits the U.S. has political and economic interests in central Africa and claims "Zaire is the key country in the region," he states "our involvement needs to be on the quiet diplomatic and political level." Unfortunately this line of thinking follows the myth that the U.S. has historically been disengaged in the former Zaire and the current DRC. The U.S. has been disengaged on humanitarian issues but not military and economic issues.
Kansteiner's wholehearted belief in market-oriented economic reforms opening the way for American trade and investment seems to ignore evidence that focusing on the extraction of mineral resources fosters government corruption rather than economic development. A narrow focus on resource extraction typically leaves the populace in abject poverty, more prone to take up arms and fight in 'diamond wars', and 'oil wars' which may offer a minuscule amount of wealth, but still offer more opportunity than their own government provides.
U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING TO AFRICA
IMET Training Cost Cost Students Trained Total Cost
Country FY98 FY99 FY98 and FY99 FY98 and FY99
Chad 100,000 87,000 58 187,000
Eritrea 409,000 439,000 28 848,000
Ethiopia 279,000 516,000 28 795,000
Namibia 203,000 145,000 18 348,000
Rwanda 473,000 314,000 106 787,000
Uganda 357,000 305,000 60 662,000
Zimbabwe 313,000 299,000 89 612,000
JCET Training Cost Cost Students Trained
Country FY98 FY99 FY98 and FY99
Chad 0 167,000 35
Eritrea 104,000 0 58
Namibia 0 54,000 39
Rwanda 120,000 0 110
Uganda 52,000 0 210
Zimbabwe 11,000 0 70
Africa Center For Strategic Studies (DoD)
Country Total FY00
Angola 64,360
Chad 64,360
DRC 32,180
Eritrea 64,360
Ethiopia 32,180
Liberia 80,450
Namibia 64,360
Rwanda 64,360
Sudan 32,180
Uganda 80,450
Zimbabwe 64,360
* Countries selected have been directly or indirectly involved in the DRC
conflict and/or recent or current war.
Under Construction
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