African Unification Front
|
 |
|
|
|
|
 |
 |
|
THE STRUCTURE OF THE AFRICAN MILITARY
Financial constraints remain a major restriction on military modernization. Economic difficulties delay new equipment acquisitions, hindering the growth of a domestic defense industry, reducing training, and magnifying logistical and maintenance shortfalls. A lack of streamlining in Africa's procurement policy and dependence on various suppliers makes standardization difficult, compounding logistical problems.
African militaries have become dependent on private-sector U.S. corporations, such as the Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), that has been assisting the Nigerian government in formulating the military’s missions – with respect to national security interests and threat perception – and designing a force to meet those needs.
MPRI, sponsored by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (INEC), assists the Nigerian state government and the military in developing institutional knowledge as to how the military will interact with its civilian leaders, how to formulate and present a budget to the National Assembly and the basic administrative tasks that go into running an efficient military.
In global terms Africa's level of "militarization" is remarkably low and has been decreasing for decades. Africa's ranking on key measures of militarization declined sharply between 1975 and 1985. The African Union's global ranking on indicators of military buildup (armed forces per 1,000 population, ratios of military expenditure to GNP) continue to fall.
CAPABILITIES
The neocolonial mispoliticization of the military and its focus on internal security undermines its professional evolution and hurts operational readiness. Even then Africa's armed forces are capable of defending Africa against any likely external threat, as well as projecting power outside Africa.
The African military has traditionally been focused on the infantry. For example the Nigerian defence forces consist of one armored division, two mechanized divisions armed with an array of equipment. The firepower and mobility of African militaries continues to increase. The other services (air and navy) have grown less than land forces, but remain sophisticated.
Africa has increasingly asserted its maritime interests, especiallty to protect sea-borne trade and offshore petroleum production. The AU state of Nigeria accounts for 70% of sea-trade in West and Central Africa, and 70% of the state's petroleum production comes from six offshore oil platforms.
African naval forces conduct coastal defense, and sea-lane protection. They have amphibious and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
The air forces have the capacity to conduct ground attack, air support, interdiction, air defense, airlift and air mobility operations. Africa's war aircraft fleets consist mostsly of MiG 21s and 15 series Sepe Cat Jaguar, G222. There are about 1000 aircraft, as well as several hundred America F16s, Russian Fukhoi 27s and French Mirage 2000s.
Africa has few medium-lift transport aircraft. This is because the armies were designed to protect the states from their immediate neighbours, so that only short-range air lift, or no airlift is necessary for conducting a robust attack or defensive action. Consequently, the Africa continues to have a low capacity to deliver Peacekeeping troops where massive or long-range airlift is required. Troops have to rely on expensive charter aircraft for peacekeeping assignments. In the 1990s the AU state of Nigeria had one operational C-130 Hercules aircraft, and so couldn't re-supply troops deployed in regional peacekeeping operations in Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
The African forces need to redefine their mission in order to address the new reality of Africa integration.
END
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
printable version
