African Unification Front
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SAHEL
Cyclical issues: food balances (past and forecast) and food aid needs just after the harvests;
Structural issues: harvest estimation methods, evaluation of food balances, early warning systems (EWSs), market information systems (MISs), food aid programmes, use of local cereals, trade, markets,stocks and prices.
The bulk of cattle, goats and sheep are in the tsetse free belt on the edge of the Sahel. This belt stretches along the whole of west Africa including parts of Ethiopia, Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Northern Guinea, Chad, Niger, Bourkina Faso, Mali, Southern and Western Mauritania, Senegal.
These areas form the livestock producing area of the savanna zone. The northern belt is limited by water shortage and the southward areas by the tsetse-infested areas of West Africa and East Africa.
Other regions with high concentrations of livestock are Western Uganda, Central and Eastern Kenya, Northern Tanzania, Sudan and Ethiopia. Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Kenya have large concentrations of camels.
Since 1984 there has not been a major drought in the Sahel. There are several systems in place that are designed to secure food security and prevent crises from developing. There has to be a continuous monitoring of the food situation in the Sahel.
November marks the end of the crop season in the Sahel. After severe shortage in a drought, the response in aid and repleshed production usually is a period of surplus, which could be just as damaging as drought (collapse of prices, bottlenecks in ports and warehouse, etc.)
Following the drought of 1984 the Sahel developed a reliable drought warning system that is lacking in other parts of Africa. The anarchy, duplication of effort and rather superficial improvisation of the crisis response of 1984 gave way to reliable national warning systems, usually helped by the local representatives of the donor countries and aid agencies.
The Sahel also has a forecast system in place that examines regularly in November meetings the "food balance sheet" for the year ahead. This forecast has improved over the years, and is now an invaluable collection of information on harvests, stocks, losses, consumption, imports (paid or donated), exports, surpluses and deficits. It is complemented by the previous year's balance sheet. The forecast is based on a number of studies and associated surveys, which over the years have covered: harvest evaluation, changes in and measurement of human consumption in Sahelian countries, calculation of stocks (farmers, traders, cereals boards).
Similarly, information about cereals markets was seen as an essential source of data. Market Information Services have been set up in most countries, to provide regular information about markets, trade, prices and noteworthy changes.
CILSS Diagnostic Permanent project (DIAPER) ', which gathers data
regionally and helps member States to improve the monitoring of the
cropping season and the quality of farming and pastoral statistics;
AGRHYMET program , launched within the CILSS in 1977, which contributes
to the Early Warning Systems [EWS] through its regional centre at
Niamey (well-equipped, with facilities to use remote sensing by
satellite) and its national correspondents in the various States;
FAO Global information and early warning system which provides its
enormous resources, sources of information and publication facilities;
the head office and agencies in the countries of the World Food
Program;
USAID Famine Early Warning System, specialising in monitoring and social surveys in Sahelian countries and the Horn of Africa. Through this project and the NG0s on the ground, the Network is well informed in good time about the areas and people at risk. The national early warning systems which collect and disseminate micro level and accurate information on the food and nutritional situation of the population and the zones at risk of food insecurity.
Food aid from the members of the Club is an instructive example of the way the Network has evolved since it was set up, especially in the last four years, when the idea emerged of a sort of "code of good conduct" for the better use of food aid.
The Food Aid Charter was produced by a committee chaired by France and comprising the Executive Secretariat of the CILSS, United States, Canada, EC and Netherlands, and was adopted after the Club du Sahel Conference in early 1990 in Bissau. It was intended to correct a number of defects, and answer criticisms, some of which were justified and others unfair or unfounded.
The reason a charter was chosen, rather than a contractual document such as an international agreement or treaty, was to save time and obtain moral commitment from the donors and the CILSS countries. Its authors were well aware that a more formal document was unlikely to be any better observed by some of the more reluctant signatories.
The executives of the CILSS and the Club du Sahel have spared no effort to translate the Charter principles into reality. They have done the rounds of all the countries concerned in the Sahel, to explain the Charter to officials in governments and administrations.
Major efforts have been made with the donors, too: comparative studies of legislation, procedures and structures for food aid; improved timing and more flexible practices, especially for urgent aid.
On the other hand, there has been a certain lack of co-ordination (particularly between agencies, their local representatives and NG0s receiving the aid) and delays in transporting the food which have prevented these programs from achieving their original objectives. Above all, the motivation of some Sahelian officials does not always, unfortunately, meet the expectations of the Charter's promoters. Too often there is insufficient motivation and co-ordination between the relevant services of a single state, or a lack of collaboration with the local representatives of the donors.
But overall, as a result of the steps taken before and especially since the publication of the Charter, the criticisms of food aid have been silenced. It is no longer said that food aid disrupts markets and prices, that it arrives too late, that it comprises inappropriate products, or that it demotivates Sahelian producers. Things are far from perfect, but great progress has been achieved, largely thanks to the Network.
Many other aspects of food aid deserve mention. The main ones are: local purchasing, triangular operations, food for work, storage facilities, counterpart funds, project aid. Progress has been made in all these areas, adapting aid to Sahelian reality.
In fact, after twelve years of experience with the changing realities of the region, the Network for the prevention of food crises in the Sahel has become a model recognized by the World Food Program, that other impoverished countries seek to imitate. Other threatened regions, particularly in Africa, might do the same.
Harvests have on the whole been satisfactory since 1985, with the exception of 1987 and 1990, and average output has risen steadily over this periods.
Take timely action to ensure that a volume of food aid better suited to needs arrives at the right time; Minimise the costs of supplying aid; Prevent aid from having negative effects and ensure that it promotes development so that it eventually becomes unnecessary. Five main areas of action were selected to meet these goals: evaluation of production, deficits and surpluses; improvement of procedures; logistical problems; implementation methods; and food aid and development.
The Network’s set-up was defined in a nutshell: It was to remain informal. It was to collect information from and disseminate information to all members as well as hold an annual meeting in the fall, and other meetings if necessary. The responsibility of these tasks was entrusted to the CILSS and Club du Sahel secretariats in liaison with the other institutions concerned, including NGOs. The first work undertaken in terms of gathering information was assigned to the FAO, DIAPER, AGRHYMET and WFP.
Although quantities delivered to the Sahel peaked at nearly 800,000 tonnes in 1973/1974, they gradually dropped back down to 300,000 to 400,000 tonnes per year up until 1983. The new drought in 1984 tripled deliveries to 1,200,000 tonnes in 1985.
In addition to the topics already cited as ordinary areas of interest, the emphasis was on harvest surpluses, their transport and storage. There was talk of triangular transactions, counterpart funds, and improved incorporation of food aid into development.
Discussion covered how basic data were collected, how they could be improved and the types of co-operation to be strengthened at national, regional and international level.
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