African Unification Front
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THE ORANGE RIVER BASIN
Eye of Kuruman Park
Southern Africa is a semi-arid country, and drought and desertification are real threats to food security. Southern Africa's fragile ecosystems are threatened by many of the factors that have put pressure on habitats and scarce resources across Africa, including poverty and population concentration. 86% of South Africa's land area is used for crop cultivation or grazing livestock, while less than 10% has been conserved.
Clean, fresh water is a scarce commodity that is being depleted at an alarming rate. More than half of the country's wetlands have already been lost. Most of South Africa's major rivers have been dammed to meet the demands of the increasing population and many have been polluted. Water resources are already almost fully utilised, and already South Africa is looking towards other Southern African countries to assist in providing sufficient water. International dependency for a resource like water can lead to regional tension and conflict.
At the present population growth and economic development rates, it is unlikely that the protected use of water resources in South Africa will be sustainable. Pressure to use more land for agricultural purposes is building as the population of over 40-million expands at about two percent a year. Poverty and glaring disparities in income matched only by Brazil adds to the growing demand for scarce resources. In rural or undeveloped areas, where incomes are very low, people are highly dependent on natural resources to meet nutritional, medicinal, housing and energy needs.
Grootfontein Canal
Although South Africa is blessed with astonishing natural variety, boasting the third highest level of biological diversity in the world. Much of the country's plant and animal life is under threat, with local species facing often fatal competition from introduced non-native flora and fauna. The region is home to almost six percent of the world's species of mammals and eight percent of its species of birds. Managing ecosystems in such a way that they benefit local populations will do much for conservation.
Many species are threatened, and extinction rates in South Africa are high by global standards. 10% of the country's mammal species and 36% of the freshwater fish species are endangered. Poaching of threatened species such as rhino remains a source of concern, while "invansives" (alien vegetation) now cover more than eight percent of South Africa's surface area, pushing out native flora and disrupting the habitat of local animals.
Collection (and often exploitation) of natural resources from these areas to meet demands from urbanised or more developed areas, is also used as a means for generating much needed income.
Spreading tourist revenues generated from game parks and farms through poor rural areas gives local populations the incentive to protect endangered animals, while formalising the production of plants and animals for medicinal purposes can relieve pressures on scarce resources.
But in a struggling economy distorted by decades of apartheid-era laws that deliberately deprived the black majority of opportunities for education or advancement, the latter will be no easy task.
AUF POLICY TO BUILDING ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN AFRICA
The dilemma arising from the environmental sustainability of current economic development initiatives vis-à-vis social stability - making this an issue increasingly likely to affect regional stability in the early part of the 21st Century.
Water poverty is likely to result in ecological collapse in conjunction with a high level of social instability. Structurally-induced water abundance, which is likely to result in ecological sustainability in conjunction with a degree of social stability. Clearly the latter is the policy objective that ought to be striven for, yet the current data available tentatively suggests that this is not the case.
Statement of the Problem:
The interaction of precipitation and people, are the two fundamental variables that underpin the developmental dilemma of the region.
Precipitation has four distinct aspects.
[1] A marked spatial maldistribution of water, with a distinct latitudinal and longitudinal trend. There are generally higher precipitation levels in the north, decreasing progressively to the south. Superimposed onto this, there are also higher levels of precipitation in the east, decreasing dramatically to the west.
[2] There is a temporal dimension to this maldistribution of water. This means that rainfall tends to be distinctly seasonal in pattern, but these seasons vary greatly over time.
[3] There is the volume aspect. The amount of precipitation that falls is subject to a high degree of variation.
These three elements combine to cause a reasonably high level of stochasticity in the overall precipitation patterns. This has significant implications for crop planning, surface runoff, soil erosion and river flows. These factors in turn impact on water management because large storage reservoirs have to be planned and built because the reliability or predictability of the precipitation patterns are of a low order of magnitude.
[4] Water quality, which is generally of a reasonably high standard except in certain specific areas where acid rain falls. Eutrophication and salinization do occur in impoundments due to the return flows of effluent and evaporative losses however.
People are the second fundamental variable of which three aspects are important. Firstly, there is a spatial distribution of people in Southern Africa that is generally at variance with the availability of water. Population distribution tends in general to be concentrated in areas that are far from supplies of water.
Population growth and The migration patterns. Pull-factors are aspects such as perceptions of better job opportunities in the larger urban areas, which tend to be focussed on places like the Gauteng area of South Africa (which is on a high plateau, far from water supplies and facing a significant water shortage as a result), Gaborone in Botswana, and Harare and Bulawayo in Zimbabwe (both on a watershed and with unique water supply problems of their own).
Migration push-factors are aspects such as the loss of livelihoods due to overpopulation, poverty, declining levels of land per capita (which is significant for a subsistence farming economy) and drought. This leads logically onto the third fundamental variable.
In order to move water over long distances pipelines are employed. Because pipelines bring life-giving and job-creating water to areas where the demand for water is high, they perform a function that can be regarded in its broadest sense as being allocative. In short, pipelines allocate a given volume of water to a specific spatial entity. It is precisely this allocative aspect of pipelines that results in the next variable, power.
The water so allocated therefore has an economic cost, whether this aspect is actually reflected in the final price that is charged for the water or not.
The water supplied by these large pipeline schemes comes at a high ecological cost, opening the debate on sustainability. Secondly, in many cases there is simply no more water left for further mobilization in readily accessible river basins. This means that the pipeline projects are becoming increasingly complex, costly, international in nature and therefore prone to political factors beyond the control of any one government.
Currently there are 26 major water transfer schemes in Southern Afric;
Kunene - Cuvelai, Eastern National Water Carrier (Okavango - Swakop),
Komati Scheme, Usuthu Scheme Maputo, Usuthu - Vaal Scheme, Grootdraai
Emergency Augmentation (Orange - Limpopo basin), Vaal - Crocodile,
Tugela - Vaal Scheme, Mooi - Umgeni Scheme, Umzimkulu - Umkomaas - Illovo
Scheme, (Umzimkulu - Umkomaas basin), Amatole Scheme (Kei - Buffalo &
Nahoon basin), Palmiet River Scheme, Riviersonderend - Berg River Project,
Orange River Project (Orange - Great Fish basin), Orange - Riet, Caledon -
Modder, Orange - Vaal, Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Vaal - Gamagara
Scheme, Springbok Water Scheme, Vioolsdrift - Noordoewer, Molatedi Dam -
Gaborone, North - South Carrier, Turgwe - Chiredzi (Zambezi basin),
Zambezi - Bulawayo (Zambezi basin), and the Zambezi - Gauteng water transfer scheme.
In terms of water and social stability, two possible scenarios are relevant to developing countries in semi-arid regions. In this regard, by linking different combinations of a first-order natural resource scarcity (water) with a second-order social resource scarcity (adaptive capacity), the authors have developed some key concepts.
Water poverty' is the end condition that is likely to result in significant environmental collapse in conjunction with a high level of social instability. This is the condition that rational policymakers would choose as a desirable end goal.
Thus in terms of this theoretical conceptualization, the interceding variable between 'water scarcity' and either 'water poverty' or 'structurally-induced water abundance' is the existence of social 'adaptive capacity', loosely defined by Ohlsson (1998;1999) as the ability of a social entity to adjust to the increasing levels of 'water scarcity'.
'Adaptive capacity' is a nebulous concept to quantify however, prompting Turton & Ohlsson (1999:11) to hypothesize that Water Demand Management (WDM) is an empirically testable manifestation of the 'adaptive capacity' of a given social entity. To this end, the existence of reflexivity in the total water consumption curve of a country can be taken to indicate a relatively high level of effective coping strategies. This enables case studies to be interrogated with the specific intention of determining the degree of 'adaptive capacity' in existence. In this regard, the existence of a reflexive water demand curve, specifically with regards to agriculture, can be assumed to be a precursor of 'natural resource reconstruction' and therefore empirical evidence of environmental sustainability.
Some Empirical Evidence:
Namibia is extremely dry and no perennial rivers flow across its soil, with the only exception of a small area known as the Caprivi Strip (where the Okavango and Kwando River are under Namibian sovereignty for a short duration only).
Informal settlements such as slums, refugee camps, use less water per capita than more affluent areas. The demographically-induced water consumption curve shows that the higher ones income the more water they consume. On average a high income person in Windhoek uses up to 600 litres a day. A middle income person on average uses 200 litres, a low income person uses 50 litres per day, while a squatter uses less than 20 litres of water per day.
Attention is drawn to the fact that no form of reflexivity is evident, in the curve, so this trajectory is clearly unsustainable in the long-term, suggesting 'water poverty' as a possible end condition if all things remain equal. Major supply sided solutions are being suggested to meet this growing demand. The Eastern National Water Carrier (ENWC) brings water South from Grootfontein. A pipeline is planned from the Okavango River at Rundu to augment the ENWC. A series of pipelines are being planned to take water from the mouth of the Congo River, through Angola and ultimately into the Kunene, Okavango and Zambezi River Basin's.
The third piece of evidence is from South Africa. Prior to 1994, the form of government was an oligarchy with a low level of legitimacy. One of the policy vehicles for this was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which actively sought to redistribute scarce water throughout society in a more equitable manner.
It should be noted that the total surface and groundwater resources have been inflated under the assumption that new technology would make additional resources available.
The lowest water estimate assumes that existing per capita consumption remains the same as it was under apartheid, but that consumption is extrapolated in keeping with the population growth projections. Significant in this scenario is the fact that structural scarcities from the apartheid era will not be redressed so the balance of privilege in society would remain roughly unchanged.
Firstly, it would de-legitimize the existing regime, which would result in long-term political instability. Social stability will thus not be achieved as 'resource capture' will not be addressed to any significant extent. Secondly, it would be ecologically unsustainable in the long-term, with all surface water having been mobilized by around the year 2012. In other words, at this time, no river water would flow into estuaries and increasing volumes of groundwater would have to be abstracted. By the year 2035 all groundwater and surface water resources will have been mobilized in this scenario.
The highest water estimate assumes that all of the RDP projects will deliver water as promised by the government. This greater availability of water, coupled with increased security of tenure of the consumers, will result in a dramatic increase in consumption. Significant in this scenario, the structural scarcities of the apartheid era will be addressed and the balance of privilege will change in society.
Two aspects in this scenario are significant. Firstly, the current regime will derive a high level of legitimacy from this policy. It will also result in a greater degree of social stability than was the case under conditions of 'resource capture' during the apartheid era. Secondly, it will be ecologically unsustainable, with significant levels of environmental collapse to be expected in the short-term. This is at odds with the new water legislation, which aims at 'natural resource reconstruction' by granting ecosystems the legal right to sufficient water for their own use.
Thus the South African government is in a serious water supply dilemma. If they supply the water as promised in terms of the RDP, then ecological collapse is almost surely imminent. If they choose instead to fall short of the RDP promises, then social stability will become an acute issue in the short-term, but with environmental collapse only being a reality in the medium to long-term.
What is absent from this data set is any indication of reflexivity at the national level. This is worrying, as it implies unsustainability over time. The window of opportunity is open however, but is likely to remain that way for only a short period of time. The high level of regime legitimacy enables far-reaching water sector reforms to be implemented in the short-term. Major reforms have already taken place, but these seem to have resulted in an increase in demand for water, thereby hastening the ecological collapse that seems to be imminent.
Clearly what now needs to happen is for South Africa to actively develop a series of water-related development policies aimed specifically at averting 'water poverty' and encouraging 'structurally-induced water abundance'.
Is this likely to happen within the desired time frame? Barbara Schreiner, in her capacity as the Chief Director: Water Use and Conservation at the South African Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) noted that there is a major capacity problem at present. This implies that while government intentions are noble, in reality South Africa is incapable of mobilizing the necessary social resources to cope with the problem of 'water scarcity', and thereby avoiding the debilitating effects of 'water poverty'. This is the reason why it is being hypothesized that social stability will be a function of the magnitude of second-order resources available to a society facing long-term 'water scarcity'. This is the scope of a new research programme being conducted by Ohlsson & Turton with a Southern African regional
focus.
Quo Vadis SADC?
Given the magnitude of the task at hand, coupled with the fact of the
interconnectedness of the entire Southern African region, SADC as the
regional structure should play a crucial role in fostering 'structurally-
induced water abundance'. To this end, there is a Protocol on Shared
Water Systems in existence. It is very weak, but efforts are under way to strengthen this legal instrument. WDM is also being actively spoken about and implemented by various countries in the region. The IUCN have played a significant role in getting stakeholders together, but there is still a long way to go before these policies start to impact on water consumption. What is needed is a concerted research effort, specifically aimed at determining the social implications of inter-sectoral allocative mechanisms. It is only by taking advantage of the gearing effect inherent in allocating water from economic activities or sectors with a low return to water, to activities with a higher efficiency ratio, that reflexivity is likely to be achieved at the national or regional level. This is socially disruptive however, and opens the politically sensitive debate on food security versus national self-sufficiency amongst other issues.
Conclusion:
Although South Africa is intuitively considered to have a higher level of technological resources available relative to other Southern African states, this may create the wrong impression and misguide researchers. A more fruitful research direction is related to the existence of 'second-order scarcities' of the social resources needed to adapt to increasing levels of 'water scarcity'. This type of approach opens up various research horizons, necessitating the development of new definitions, concepts and models.
The first is 'water poverty' with a low level of social stability combined with ecological unsustainability. The second is 'structurally-induced water abundance' with a high level of social stability combined with ecological sustainability. Existing data tentatively suggests that various states in Southern Africa are not necessarily headed for the latter. This suggests that the interaction between water scarcity and social stability is likely to become a significant threat to regional security in the early part of the 21st Century. A concerted effort needs to be launched now if social stability is to be maintained over time. This effort will of necessity involve cooperation between research partners, stakeholders, foreign donor agencies, SADC and various national governments in a common approach that has been hitherto impossible to achieve.
ORANGE FREESTATE
Between the Orange River and its principal tributary, the Vaal, lies a rolling prairie, about 1400m above sea level, flooded with sunshine, green and warm in summer, brown and crispy cold in winter. From one horizon to another, north, south, east and west, this prairieland stretches away with the winds like a whispering siren's voice tempting the traveler ever onwards with only a distant hillock to act as a beacon on a journey seemingly without end. The prairieland is the summit of the central plateau of South Africa. Geologically it's all part of the Karoo system, the extensive series of sedimentary deposits laid down in successive epochs between 125 and 250 million years ago.
The soil is deep, rich and the surface only gently undulating. In the portion drained by the Vaal River grow huge fields of wheat, maize, sorghum, groundnuts, sunflowers, oats, potatoes, onions, barley, peas, beans, lucerne and buckwheat. The towns are small, inhabited islands scattered at random in this ocean of cultivation. In the dryer southern portion, drained by the Orange River, sheep graze, the flocks wandering over the land like white shadows of ghost clouds, while wind-pumps murmur and creak as they fill the drinking troughs and reservoirs with the characteristic alkaline water of the Karoo.
Nearly 30 000 farms cover these central plains. The area has always been regarded as one of the principal pantries of the continent of Africa. In former years, Bushmen hunted the herds of plains game - springbok, blesbok, hartebeest, gnu and qwagga - which lived there in herds so large that their numbers were beyond count. European hunters were also lured into the area and the sound of their guns was an incessant voice of doom until the game animals were almost completely eliminated. The hunters told the farmers of the fertility of the central plains and so the Orange FreeState was born.
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